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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 
Article VII, Section 5 of the Utah Constitution, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2-2(4) (1982), and Utah R. App. P. 42. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. The trial court correctly awarded Dr. Osborn summary 
judgment since plaintiffs' allegations were not proven by competent 
expert testimony. 
"Because summary judgment is granted as a matter of law rather 
than fact, [the Court of Appeals] review[s] for correctness the 
legal conclusions of . . . the trial court." Butterfield v. Okubo, 
831 P.2d 97, 102 (Utah 1992) (cited cases omitted). See also Themv 
v. Seagull Enterprises, Inc., 595 P.2d 526, 529 (Utah 1979) (court 
evaluates whether moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law where there is no genuine dispute as to material issues of 
fact or where court assumes facts as contended by losing party). 
2. The trial court's order striking the affidavit of 
plaintiffs' proposed emergency room expert was appropriate since 
the affidavit attempted to raise matters not properly admissible in 
evidence. 
"Affidavits of experts are insufficient to defeat summary 
judgment unless foundational facts are set forth supporting their 
opinions and conclusions." King v. Searle Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 
832 P.2d 858, 864 n.2 (Utah 1992). "On review of evidentiary 
rulings by the trial court [the Court of Appeals] will not reverse 
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unless it is shown that the trial court has abused its discretion," 
Matter of Estate of Justheim, 824 P.2d 432, 436 (Utah App. 1991), 
since "the trial court has discretion to determine the 
admissibility of expert testimony, and to determine if the witness 
is qualified to give an opinion on a particular matter." Anton v. 
Thomas, 806 P.2d 744, 746 (Utah App. 1991). 
3. Summary judgment was appropriate since the plaintiffs 
themselves verified under oath that a cardiologist would need to 
speak to the standard of care applicable to Dr. Osborn's treatment 
and no testimony from a cardiologist was provided. 
This Court should review the trial courts ultimate 
conclusion regarding plaintiffs7 admission under a correctness 
standard with the underlying factual findings not to be set aside 
"unless they are found to be clearly erroneous." See State v. 
Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1271 (Utah 1993) (determining correctness 
of court's evidentiary treatment of confession). 
4. Since plaintiffs failed to properly controvert the facts 
set forth in Dr. Osborn's memorandum in support of his motion for 
summary judgment, the trial court correctly concluded that those 
facts were deemed admitted and summary judgment for Dr. Osborn was 
appropriate as a matter of law. 
"[The appellate court] will not interfere with the trial 
court's case management unless its actions amount to an abuse of 
discretion." Berrett v. Denver & Rio Grande, 830 P.2d 291, 293 
(Utah App.) (citation omitted), cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (1992). 
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5. This Court should not consider plaintiffs' claims 
(regarding the Court ordering additional materials in the record) 
when plaintiffs did not raise this issue in their docketing 
statement on appeal. 
Since plaintiffs in part did not mention an issue in 
their docketing statement, it was not timely specified on appeal. 
Cf. Justheim, 824 P.2d at 437. 
6. Even if this Court chooses to analyze plaintiffs' 
argument not raised in their docketing statement (concerning 
additional information the court ordered placed in the record), the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion and the decision was at 
worst harmless error. 
"On review of evidentiary rulings by the trial court [the 
Court of Appeals] will not reverse unless it is shown that the 
trial court has abused its discretion." Justheim, 824 P.2d at 436. 
Even if the court erred in considering such evidence, such error 
was harmless unless absent the error there is a reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable result for the nonmoving party. 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
Other than the Utah Supreme Court and appellate court cases 
cited in Dr. Osborn's brief, which are controlling in this case, 
the Court is referred to Rule 4-501(2) (b) of the Utah Code of 
Judicial Administration which states: 
The points and authorities in opposition to a motion for 
summary judgment shall begin with a section that contains 
a concise statement of material facts as to which the 
party contends a genuine issue exists. Each disputed 
fact shall be stated in separate numbered sentences and 
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shall specifically refer to those portions of the record 
upon which the opposing party relies and, if applicable, 
shall state the numbered sentence or sentences of the 
movant's facts that are disputed. All material facts set 
forth in the movant's statement and properly supported by 
an accurate reference to the record shall be deemed 
admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless 
specifically controverted by the opposing party's 
statement. 
(Emphasis added.) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Mature of the Case 
This is an appeal from the trial court's awarding of summary 
judgment to Dr. Osborn on the grounds that (1) plaintiffs 
essentially admitted they had no expert to provide testimony 
necessary to show that Dr. Osborn committed malpractice; (2) the 
affidavit of plaintiffs' proposed expert clearly indicated he is 
not an expert in the same area of practice as Dr. Osborn; (3) the 
affidavit of plaintiffs' expert lacked foundation, was based on 
hearsay and speculation and did not state the evidence as it 
appears from the record; (4) plaintiffs' allegations of facts being 
extant was not supported by the record; (5) plaintiffs' opposition 
memorandum to summary judgment did not set forth a concise 
statement of material issues genuinely in issue as required by Rule 
4-501(2) (b) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration; (6) 
plaintiffs did not provide the Court with a statement of disputed 
facts or those facts specifically controverted by admissible 
evidence; and (7) the record revealed sufficient admissions to 
support the motion for summary judgment. (R. at 287-89.) 
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B. Course and Disposition of Proceedings Below 
Plaintiffs filed suit against Dr. Osborn and others (including 
an emergency room physician, Dr. Dowdall) to recover damages for 
what they claimed to be medical malpractice by the defendants 
resulting in the death of their son. Dr. Osborn, a cardiologist 
specializing in electrophysiology, filed a motion for summary 
judgment claiming that plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of 
proof of establishing (1) the standard of care applicable to 
Dr. Osborn, (2) breach of that standard of care, and (3) proximate 
causation resulting therefrom, all through expert testimony of a 
physician sharing Dr. Osborn's specialty. 
In response, plaintiffs filed the affidavit of an emergency 
room physician (Dr. Bushnell), which affidavit the court concluded 
was lacking foundation, based on hearsay and speculation and failed 
to state the evidence as it appeared from the record. Accordingly, 
the Court granted Dr. Osborn summary judgment. 
In granting summary judgment the court ruled that it was 
"fully advised in the premises." Nevertheless, before the final 
order and judgment were signed Dr. Osborn requested that the court 
order the record to be supplemented so as to clearly indicate that 
plaintiffs' own "admissions" set forth in their answers to 
discovery (and previously filed in the record by plaintiffs 
themselves) supported the awarding of summary judgment in this 
case. Over plaintiffs' objection the court so ruled. 
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STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
Preamble 
Counsel for Dr. Osborn on appeal is the same counsel that 
represented Dr. Osborn below and prepared the papers filed for 
matters preceding this brief, including the arguments leading to 
summary judgment in this case. Accordingly, rather than quote at 
length the full text of the facts and arguments raised below (and 
for ease in this Court's review of the same), counsel will for the 
most part be paraphrasing or reasserting those arguments in this 
brief as if drafted for the first time. 
Plaintiffs' Statement of Facts Unsupported by the Record 
Dr. Osborn disputes plaintiffs' statement of facts in their 
brief to the extent they are entirely unsupported opposed to merely 
disputed. For example, see page 7 of plaintiffs' brief where 
plaintiffs claim "Dr. Dowdall, the emergency room physician, would 
like to have had Ted Dikeou at another hospital so that he could be 
treated directly by Dr. Osborn, his cardiologist." This statement 
is incorrect to the extent that plaintiffs seek to argue that 
Dr. Dowdall wanted to move Ted Dikeou to another hospital before he 
went into a coma. Plaintiffs' citation to the record to support 
this fact (R. 190) unequivocally demonstrates that it was Dr. 
Dowdall's testimony that only after Ted went into a coma he would 
liked to have transferred him to another hospital. 
Similarly, although plaintiffs argue that the facts indicate 
that "had Dr. Osborn requested, he undoubtedly would have been 
granted courtesy privileges [at St. Mark's Hospital] to treat his 
6 
patient in the emergency situation" since Dr. Osborn later went to 
St. Mark's Hospital and "examined Ted, reviewed his medical records 
and spent some time reviewing his condition with Mr. and Mrs. 
Dikeou," plaintiffs' cited support, R. 235, paragraph 21, is an 
affidavit lacking foundation and R. 160 categorically indicates 
this was only a social visit. Also, plaintiffs' claim on page 7 of 
their brief that Dr. Osborn's decision not to go to St. Mark's 
Hospital "was just an excuse and could have been easily overcome" 
is not supported by the cite to the record. 
1. On or about March 2, 1992, defendant Dr. Osborn filed a 
motion for summary judgment with supporting memorandum in the trial 
court below. (See R. 132-33.) 
2. The uncontroverted facts set forth in Dr. Osborn's 
memorandum in support of his motion for summary judgment were 
stated as follows: 
1. Dr. Osborn graduated from the University of 
Missouri at Kansas City in 1978 with a Bachelor of Arts 
Degree in Biology. Thereafter, he attended medical 
school at the University of Missouri at Kansas City and 
received his Doctorate of Medicine in 1981. (See 
deposition of Jeffrey S. Osborn, M.D. (hereinafter 
"Osborn deposition") at p. 4 [attached as Exhibit A to 
Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Jeffrey S. Osborn, 
M.D.'s Motion for Summary Judgment].) 
2. Dr. Osborn completed a residency in internal 
medicine at St. Luke's Hospital in Kansas City and a 
three-year cardiology fellowship at the Mid-America Heart 
Institute in Kansas City. (See Osborn deposition at pp. 
4-5.) 
3. Dr. Osborn is board certified both in internal 
medicine and cardiovascular diseases and is a member of 
the American College of Cardiology, American College of 
Physicians, North American Society in Pacing and 
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Electrophysiology and the International Society of Heart 
Transplantation. (See Osborn deposition at p. 7.) 
4. The above-captioned action is a medical 
malpractice case in which plaintiffs allege, in part, 
that the defendant, Dr. Osborn, was negligent in his care 
and treatment of the decedent. (See plaintiffs' 
Complaint at U 20.) 
5. While plaintiffs filed their complaint on or 
about Jul^, 1991, and as of the date of [the motion for 
summary judgment], they have failed to designate an 
expert cardiologist who is qualified and willing to 
testify that Dr. Osborn was negligent as alleged by 
plaintiffs in this case. (See deposition of James T. 
Dikeou (hereinafter "James Dikeou deposition") at pp. 41, 
60-62, attached as Exhibit B [to Defendant's Memorandum 
in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment]; deposition of 
Helen K. Dikeou (hereinafter "Helen Dikeou deposition") 
at pp. 36-37, 61, 74-75, 89-92, attached as Exhibit C [to 
Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment].) 
6. In his deposition taken on September 27, 1991, 
defendant Dr. Osborn described the decedent, Ted Dikeou, 
as having a moderately common condition identified as the 
Wolff-Parkinson-White syndrome, which relates to an 
abnormal number of electrical conduction systems in the 
heart. Dr. Osborn noted that with medical treatment 
patients with this syndrome often may achieve a normal 
life expectancy. (See Osborn deposition at 
pp. 7-8.) 
7. Dr. Osborn testified that on or about February 
21, 1990, at 12:30 [a.m.], he had received a call at home 
from the decedent, who indicated that he "felt his heart 
was fast," which condition the decedent believed may have 
been caused by his recently prescribed asthma medicines. 
Dr. Osborn suggested that the decedent call him back if 
the decedent's condition did not improve. (See Osborn 
deposition at p. 17.) 
8. Dr. Osborn later received another call from the 
decedent informing Dr. Osborn that the decedent wished to 
go to the St. Mark's Hospital Emergency Room to have 
health care professionals there investigate his 
condition. Dr. Osborn informed the decedent that he was 
not on the staff of that hospital so he could not attend 
the decedent there, but that it was the decedent's choice 
whether to go to St. Mark's Hospital. (See Osborn 
deposition at p. 19.) 
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9. Sometime later, Dr. Osborn received a call from 
the St. Mark's Hospital Emergency Room physician, co-
defendant Dr. Michael D. Dowdall, who informed Dr. Osborn 
that Ted Dikeou was at the St. Mark's Hospital and was 
experiencing a heart rhythm identified as paroxysmal 
atrial tachycardia (PAT). In response to information 
received from Dr. Dowdall, Dr. Osborn agreed with 
Dr. Dowdall that appropriate treatment for PAT would be 
a conservative medical approach with cardioversion being 
performed only with an indication of hemodynamic 
compromise. (See Osborn deposition at p. 20.) 
10. Plaintiffs have, in part, alleged that after 
the decedent's admission at St. Mark's Hospital, 
defendants St. Mark's Hospital and Michael D. Dowdall, 
M.D. "negligently and carelessly treated, prescribed and 
administered improper and inappropriate medicines and 
treatment" to the decedent, which "in fact sensitized the 
decedent and worsened his heart condition causing a 
deterioration of heart, rhythm and blood circulation, 
damage to his brain and the collapse of regular body 
functions." (See plaintiffs' Complaint at H 13.) [Ted 
Dikeou died.] 
11. Dr. Osborn was subsequently informed by Dr. 
John Perry, a cardiologist on staff at St. Mark's 
Hospital, that when Dr. Perry arrived at the hospital to 
assist with the decedent's care, he had learned that the 
decedent had been experiencing atrial fibrillation of his 
heart and not PAT. (See Osborn deposition at p. 32.) 
12. Dr. Osborn testified that if Dr. Dowdall had 
originally informed him that the decedent was 
experiencing atrial fibrillation and not PAT, Dr. 
Osborn's response to Dr. Dowdall regarding appropriate 
treatment would have been different than that rendered 
the patient by Dr. Dowdall. Dr. Osborn also noted that 
he could not have provided medical treatment to the 
decedent at St. Mark's Hospital inasmuch as he did not 
have staff privileges at that facility. (See Osborn 
deposition at p. 79.) 
13. Plaintiff Helen K. Dikeou testified in her 
deposition that on the night in question she had traveled 
to St. Mark's Hospital with her son and while there had 
repeatedly asked Dr. Dowdall to call Dr. Osborn about her 
son's condition. (See Helen Dikeou deposition at p. 71.) 
14. Helen Dikeou noted that prior to Dr. Dowdall 
calling Dr. Osborn, Dr. Dowdall had injected her son with 
medication (see Helen Dikeou deposition at pp. 30-31) and 
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that when she herself finally called Dr. Osborn by 
telephone from St. Mark's Hospital, he stated that he had 
spoken to Dr. Dowdall and was himself waiting to hear 
back from Dr. Dowdall or St. Mark's Hospital about the 
decedent's condition (see Helen Dikeou deposition at 
p. 34). 
15. Helen Dikeou testified that no medically 
trained professionals had been specifically critical of 
Dr. Osborn's care of the decedent, although (a) a nurse 
had been critical about how long it took St. Mark's 
Hospital personnel to revive the decedent once they 
undertook treatment (see Helen Dikeou deposition at pp. 
36-37); (b) anonymous doctors had summarily informed her 
friends that she should "pursue" this matter (see Helen 
Dikeou deposition at p. 39); (c) she had had the 
impression that Dr. Osborn felt that "things weren't 
right" (see Helen Dikeou deposition at p. 40); (d) a 
neurologist not giving a medical opinion had casually 
stated that "it sounded like something was amiss" (see 
Helen Dikeou deposition at p. 42); and (e) other 
physicians who were not cardiologists, had, likewise, 
casually so opined (see Helen Dikeou deposition at p. 42-
43). 
16. Helen Dikeou also stated that she knows of no 
instance where Dr. Dowdall expressly criticized Dr. 
Osborn's care (see Helen Dikeou deposition at p. 61) and 
stated that none of the other doctors at the hospital 
were critical about the care rendered to her son (see 
Helen Dikeou deposition at pp. 74-75), but that her 
attorney had originally suggested that plaintiffs include 
Dr. Osborn in this suit (see Helen Dikeou deposition at 
pp. 75-76) . 
17. Helen Dikeou noted that no one had ever told 
her that [the decedent] was treated at St. Mark's 
Hospital in accordance with the instructions supplied by 
Dr. Osborn and that she knows of no medical records 
referencing the same. She also stated that she knows of 
no one who has alleged that Dr. Osborn was negligent in 
failing to properly ascertain the condition of her son 
and that she, in her own words, instead "understood . . 
. that based on what information was given to [Dr. 
Osborn], I'm sure he acted accordingly. He wasn't there 
to see the records or the heart strip or anything like 
that. So all he was acting on was information that was 
given to him." (See Helen Dikeou deposition at pp. 89-
91.) 
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18. Importantly, Helen Dikeou testified that she 
had been aware prior to taking her son to St. Mark's 
Hospital in February, 1990, that Dr. Osborn did not 
practice and did not have privileges at St. Mark's 
Hospital and, accordingly, could not come to St. Mark's 
Hospital and attend to her son on the evening her son 
chose to be admitted there. (See Helen Dikeou deposition 
at pp. 92-93.) 
19. Helen Dikeou also testified that, although in 
her Complaint she had alleged that Dr. Osborn should have 
examined her son, she knew that Dr. Osborn could not do 
so at St. Mark's Hospital where the decedent himself had 
chosen to be admitted (see Helen Dikeou deposition at pp. 
93-94) and no one has ever told her that Dr. Osborn 
failed to properly respond to her son's condition after 
he went to St. Mark's Hospital (see Helen Dikeou 
deposition at p. 96). 
20. Plaintiff James T. Dikeou, the decedent's 
father, testified on November 7, 1991, that Dr. Perry had 
never expressed dismay or any concern about how Ted 
Dikeou had been treated medically. (See James Dikeou 
deposition at p. 41.) 
21. James Dikeou also testified that no one has 
ever told him that Dr. Osborn failed to examine or 
diagnose the decedent or that Dr. Osborn misprescribed 
medication for the decedent or failed to respond to 
conditions the decedent developed at St. Mark's Hospital. 
(See James Dikeou deposition at p. 60.) 
22. James Dikeou reiterated that he had no facts 
upon which to base any allegations of wrongdoing on the 
part of Dr. Osborn. (See James Dikeou deposition at pp. 
61-62.) 
23. Co-defendant Dr. Michael D. Dowdall admitted in 
his deposition on September 27, 1991, that he had told 
Dr. Osborn that if the decedent needed to be treated with 
electrical shock and if the treatment did not work, he 
would let Dr. Osborn know. (See deposition of Dr. 
Michael D. Dowdall (hereinafter "Dowdall deposition") at 
p. 48, attached as Exhibit D [to Defendant's Memorandum 
in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment].) 
24. Dr. Dowdall also testified that he later 
decided not to call Dr. Osborn back; and Dr. Dowdall 
conceded that there was a cardiologist on call at St. 
Mark's Hospital on the night the decedent admitted 
himself there. (See Dowdall deposition at pp. 53-54.) 
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25. Dr. Dowdall noted that only after the decedent 
experienced cardiac arrest, Dr. Dowdall considered 
transferring the decedent to a hospital where Dr. Osborn 
had privileges. (See Dowdall deposition at p. 61.) And 
Dr. Dowdall also stated that he had felt competent to 
undertake the treatment of the decedent and, at no time, 
felt overwhelmed or overpowered or that the treatment 
required was beyond his abilities. (See Dowdall 
deposition at p. 71.) 
26. Dr. Dowdall admitted that he knew that Dr. 
Osborn was not on the staff at St. Mark's Hospital. (See 
Dowdall deposition at p. 74.) 
27. Dr. John Joseph Perry, the staff cardiologist 
at St. Mark's Hospital who also treated the decedent 
after the decedent had admitted himself there, testified 
during his deposition that he is a board certified 
cardiologist on staff at St. Mark's Hospital. (See 
deposition of Dr. John Joseph Perry (hereinafter "Perry 
deposition") at pp. 4-6, attached as Exhibit E to 
Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment.) 
28. Dr. Perry testified that Dr. Osborn does not 
practice at St. Mark's Hospital and does not have staff 
privileges there. (See Perry deposition at pp. 12, 16.) 
29. Dr. Perry testified that in his opinion the 
electrical conversions performed at St. Mark's Hospital 
by Dr. Dowdall had not been effective since they involved 
"inadequate voltage or power." (See Perry deposition at 
p. 35.) 
30. Dr. Perry also noted that the heart monitor 
strips he had reviewed when caring for the decedent at 
St. Mark's Hospital had revealed atrial fibrillation and 
not a PAT condition even though it was his impression 
that Dr. Dowdall had described the patient as 
experiencing PAT (see Perry deposition at pp. 46, 59-60) . 
31. Dr. Perry also noted that the medication the 
decedent had received at St. Mark's Hospital would have 
been appropriate if the [decedent] had been experiencing 
PAT arrhythmia at the time that Dr. Osborn had been so 
informed. (See Perry deposition at pp. 60-62.) 
32. All the testimony in this case evidences that 
Dr. Osborn was not negligent in his treatment of [the 
decedent] and that any medical care and treatment 
rendered by Dr. Osborn to the decedent complied in all 
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respects with the standards of professional care, 
learning, skill and treatment ordinarily possessed and 
used by cardiologists in good standing in this and 
similar communities on or about February, 1990, which 
fact is not contested by expert testimony or the 
documentation or records involved in this case. (See 
Exhibits A-E [to Defendant's Memorandum in Support of 
Motion for Summary Judgment].) 
(See R. 137-46 and deposition pages attached thereto at R. 152-
203.) 
3. The basis for Dr. Osborn's motion for summary judgment 
centered upon "plaintiffs' failure to prove their case of 
negligence against Dr. Osborn by not producing an expert able to 
establish a breach of the [applicable] standard of care by Dr. 
Osborn and that the alleged breach of the standard of care by Dr. 
Osborn was the proximate cause of the injuries plaintiffs allege." 
(R. 136-37.) 
4. As a courtesy to plaintiffs' attorneys, Dr. Osborn's 
counsel agreed that plaintiffs need not file their opposition 
memorandum to summary judgment with affidavits plaintiffs believed 
necessary to controvert the same until after plaintiffs7 counsel 
"complete[d their] preparation for designation of witnesses." (See 
R. at 214.) 
5. On March 18, 1992, plaintiffs filed their designation of 
witnesses with the court and as experts claimed they would in part 
offer: 
11. Michael D. Lesh, M.D., University of 
California, San Francisco, [address] . . . a licensed 
cardiologist, will testify regarding the standard of 
medical care, the deviation from that standard of care by 
Dr. Michael D. Dowdall and Dr. Jeffrey S. Osborn in their 
diagnosis and treatment of Theodore James Dikeou, the 
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effects of their treatment on Ted Dikeou's heart and 
cardiac arrhythmia, and the cause and effect relation-
ships between their respective actions and treatment 
which ultimately resulted in the death of Ted Dikeou. 
12. Fred Bushnell, M.D.f [address and phone number] 
a duly licensed emergency room physician, will testify 
regarding the standard of medical care for an emergency 
room physician and for the treatment of patients such as 
the plaintiffs' son, the departure from that standard of 
care by Michael D. Dowdall, M.D. [an emergency room 
physician] and Jeffrey S. Osborn, M.D., and the direct 
relationship between that departure from the acceptable 
standards of medical care to the subsequent death of 
Theodore James Dikeou. 
(R. 221-22 (emphasis added).) 
6. On or about March 30, 1992, plaintiffs filed their 
opposition memorandum to Dr. Osborn's motion for summary judgment; 
and in doing so plaintiffs submitted the affidavit of an emergency 
room physician, Dr. J. Fred Bushnell, in an apparent attempt to 
comply with this Court's case law that a competent expert's 
testimony must be presented to establish a breach of the applicable 
standard of care on behalf of a health care professional. (See R. 
225-37.) Bushnell's affidavit was in part offered to establish the 
standard of care applicable to Dr. Osborn (a cardiologist 
specializing in electrophysiology) even though plaintiffs had 
already designated Dr. Bushnell as "testify[ing] regarding the 
standard of medical care for an emergency room physician." 
(R. 222.) 
7. Importantly, as another part of plaintiffs' opposition to 
defendant's motion for summary judgment, plaintiffs submitted to 
the Court their answers to Dr. Osborn's interrogatories which had 
been prepared on March 9, 1992. Included was a response to 
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defendant's interrogatory seeking a basis for plaintiffs' 
allegations against Dr. Osborn where plaintiffs themselves verified 
under oath that: "Plaintiff believes that this Interrogatory is 
best answered by a medical expert in the field of cardiology, and 
in response, attaches a copy of a letter opinion from Michael D. 
Lesh, M.D., a cardiologist contacted by Plaintiff's attorneys to 
evaluate the care given to Theodore "Ted" Dikeou, Tandl which 
opinion will be supplemented hereafter." (See R. 246 (emphasis 
added)•) 
8. Plaintiffs' own cardiology expert was not critical of Dr. 
Osborn's treatment and care of the plaintiff and did not claim that 
such treatment and care, opposed to the treatment and care rendered 
by other health care providers and one-time defendants, led to 
plaintiff's death. (See R. 312-13.) 
9. On April 3, 1992, Dr. Osborn filed a motion to strike the 
affidavit of plaintiffs' emergency room expert, Dr. J. Fred 
Bushnell. (R. 252-64.) 
10. A notice to submit for decision Dr. Osborn's motion for 
summary judgment was filed on or about April 3, 1992. (See R. 265-
66.) 
11. On or about April 16, 1992, plaintiffs filed their 
opposition memorandum to Dr. Osborn's motion to strike the 
affidavit of Dr. Bushnell. (R. 273-83.) Plaintiffs essentially 
claimed therein that "Utah case law does not require that an expert 
witness be trained in the same field as the defendant in 
professional malpractice litigation" (R. 275) and that Dr. 
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Bushnell's affidavit should be considered by the court 
notwithstanding Dr. Osborn's claims that it was inadmissible. (R. 
279-81.) 
12. On April 17, 1992, after plaintiffs had filed their 
opposition memorandum to Dr. Osborn's motion to strike the 
affidavit of Dr. Bushnell, the Court, Judge Richard H. Moffat 
presiding, ruled in a minute entry as follows: 
The Motion for Summary Judgment in favor of the defendant 
Jeffrey S. Osborn, M.D. is hereby granted. The Court is 
of the opinion for the reasons, inter alia, set forth in 
the Memorandum in Support of said Motion and the Joint 
Reply Memorandum in Support thereof that the plaintiffs 
have, by the record, patently admitted that they have no 
expert to provide testimony necessary to show that Dr. 
Osborn's involvement in the treatment of the decedent 
(there being no actual treatment by Dr. Osborn on the 
night that the damage to the decedent's heart occurred) 
did not rise to the standard required under Utah Law. In 
an attempt to satisfy this short coming after the filing 
of the Motion the plaintiffs filed the affidavit of J. 
Fred Bushnell, M.D. An examination of that affidavit 
clearly indicates that Dr. Bushnell is not an expert in 
the same area of practice as Dr. Osborn. Further an 
examination of his opinion clearly reveals a lack of 
foundation and is also clearly based on hearsay. Even 
given a presumption of the ability to rely on hearsay to 
an expert's testimony said affidavit does not meet the 
criteria required to enable him to be able to testify as 
to the standard of the care required for a physician 
specializing in the same specialty as Dr. Osborn. 
Another deficiency of Dr. Bushnell's affidavit is that as 
to most of the content of paragraphs 11 through 23 the 
statements are based on speculation and further do not 
state the evidence as it appears from the record. 
Therefore, the Motion to Strike Dr. Bushnell's Affidavit 
is therefore granted. In addition, it should be noted 
that the claim of allegations of fact being extant simply 
is not supported by the record. The memorandum of the 
[plaintiffs] does not set forth the concise statement of 
the material issues of fact that are genuinely in issue 
as required by Rule 4-501(2) (b) of the Utah Code of 
Judicial Administration. Further there is not a 
statement of each disputed fact as required in a separate 
numbered sentence nor are any of the facts specifically 
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converted by admissible evidence and in fact the record 
reveals admission sufficient to support the Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
(See 287-89.) 
13. On or about May 8, 1992, Dr. Osborn filed a motion for 
filing of discovery responses with supporting memorandum and 
exhibits. Therein, Dr. Osborn moved the Court to order that 
plaintiffs' answers to Dr. Osborn's interrogatories and answers to 
defendant St. Marks Hospital's first set of interrogatories be 
filed as part of the record in this case. (See R. 297-302.) 
Importantly, this motion was redundant insofar as plaintiffs' 
answers to Dr. Osborn's interrogatories were involved since 
plaintiffs themselves had already filed interrogatory answers with 
the Court as an exhibit to their memorandum in opposition to Dr. 
Osborn's motion for summary judgment. (See R. 246.) 
14. In defendant's motion for filing discovery responses, Dr. 
Osborn suggested that the Court should make plaintiffs' answers to 
interrogatories a part of the record since plaintiffs' own 
admissions under oath (concerning the fact that only a cardiologist 
could best testify as to allegations involving Dr. Osborn) 
represent and support "the correctness of the Court's March 17, 
1992 rulings on Dr. Osborn's motion for summary judgment and motion 
to strike the affidavit of plaintiffs' emergency room expert." 
(See R. 299-301.) Dr. Osborn also submitted correspondence to the 
trial court, which correspondence (filed May 5, 1992) advised the 
Court as to the proposed summary judgment and order which 
Dr. Osborn's counsel had been instructed to prepare and the nature 
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of the motion to supplement the record with discovery responses. 
Further, that letter stated that "if the Court wishes to postpone 
entry of the [order to supplement the record] until plaintiffs have 
an opportunity to object to the motion, we will be pleased to 
respond to any objection. We will also gladly address any 
questions or concerns the Court may have." (See R. 295-96.) A 
copy of this letter was sent to all counsel. 
15. As ordered, Dr. Osborn also submitted his summary 
judgment and order on May 4, 1992, which the Court signed on May 8, 
1992 (R. 340-42), together with the order authorizing 
supplementation of the record to include plaintiffs' answers to 
interrogatories. (R. 338-39.) Fourteen days after the Court 
entered its summary judgment in this matter and its order allowing 
for supplementation of the record and twenty-one days after being 
hand-served with Dr. Osborn's motion to file discovery responses, 
plaintiffs filed a memorandum in opposition to defendant's motion 
for filing of discovery responses. (R. 346-49.) In doing so, 
plaintiffs ignored the fact that as part of their opposition to the 
motion for summary judgment, plaintiffs themselves had already 
filed in the record some of the same answers (R. 246) to Dr. 
Osborn's interrogatories that plaintiffs claimed the court should 
not have ordered filed to complete the record. (See R. 346-48.) 
16. Dr. Osborn filed a reply to plaintiffs' opposition to the 
filing of discovery responses. Therein Dr. Osborn noted that 
"plaintiffs' memorandum in opposition to defendant's motion for 
filing of discovery responses is moot since it was filed after the 
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Court granted defendant's motion" and that plaintiffs7 claims were 
likewise without merit since the trial court had discretion to 
supplement the record with any sworn matters that had been 
presented by the parties. (See R. 351-54.) 
17. On October 13, 1992, plaintiffs filed their notice of 
appeal in this case (R. 363-64) and thereafter submitted a 
docketing statement on or about November 6, 1992. Importantly, 
therein plaintiffs did not raise any claim that the trial court 
improperly supplemented the record with plaintiffs7 answers to 
interrogatories. (Appellate record.) 
ARGUMENT 
Point I 
The Trial Court Correctly Awarded Dr. Osborn 
Summary Judgment Since Plaintiffs7 Allegations 
Were Not Proven by Competent Expert Testimony 
In filing their action against Dr. Osborn plaintiffs 
essentially alleged that (1) Dr. Osborn should have performed 
further testing, investigation and treatment of Ted Dikeou, (2) Dr. 
Osborn should have been aware that an emergency room physician, Dr. 
Dowdall, missed the diagnosis of Ted Dikeou's heart rhythm, (3) Dr. 
Osborn should have been aware that Dr. Dowdall's misdiagnosis would 
result in mismedication, (4) as a cardiologist Dr. Osborn should 
appreciate the seriousness of the occurrences of which Ted Dikeou 
complained and should have further investigated the same at a 
hospital where he was lacking staff privileges, (5) as a 
cardiologist Dr. Osborn should have known that the aspects of Ted 
Dikeou's medical problem were inconsistent with Dr. Dowdall's 
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evaluation, and (6) as a cardiologist Dr. Osborn should have done 
something different to confirm the condition for which medication 
was offered by an emergency room physician. (R. at 5, 233-36, 245-
47.) 
In awarding Dr. Osborn summary judgment in this case, Judge 
Moffat ruled: 
The Motion for Summary Judgment in favor of the defendant 
Jeffrey S. Osborn, M.D. is hereby granted. The Court is 
of the opinion for the reasons, inter alia, set forth in 
the Memorandum in Support of said Motion and the Joint 
Reply Memorandum in Support thereof that the plaintiffs 
have, by the record, patently admitted that they have no 
expert to provide testimony necessary to show that Dr. 
Osborn's involvement in the treatment of the decedent 
(there being no actual treatment by Dr. Osborn on the 
night that the damage to the decedents heart occurred) 
did not rise to the standard required under Utah Law. In 
an attempt to satisfy this short coming after the filing 
of the Motion the plaintiffs filed the affidavit of J. 
Fred Bushnell, M.D. An examination of that affidavit 
clearly indicates that Dr. Bushnell is not an expert in 
the same area of practice as Dr. Osborn. Further an 
examination of his opinion clearly reveals a lack of 
foundation and is also clearly based on hearsay. Even 
given a presumption of the ability to rely on hearsay to 
an experts testimony said affidavit does not meet the 
criteria required to enable him to be able to testify as 
to the standard of the care required for a physician 
specializing in the same specialty as Dr. Osborn. 
Another deficiency of Dr. Bushnell's affidavit is that as 
to most of the content of paragraphs 11 through 23 the 
statements are based on speculation and further do not 
state the evidence as it appears from the record. 
Therefore, the Motion to Strike Dr. Bushnell's Affidavit 
is therefore granted. In addition, it should be noted 
that the claim of allegations of fact being extant simply 
is not supported by the record. The memorandum of the 
[plaintiffs] does not set forth the concise statement of 
the material issues of fact that are genuinely in issue 
as required by Rule 4-501(2) (b) of the Utah Code of 
Judicial Administration. Further there is not a 
statement of each disputed fact as required in a separate 
numbered sentence nor are any of the facts specifically 
converted by admissible evidence and in fact the record 
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reveals admission sufficient to support the Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
As this Court stated in Olson v. Park Craig Olson, Inc., 815 
P.2d 1356, 1358 (Utah App. 1991), "summary judgment is appropriate 
'only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.' In our review 
of whether summary judgment was properly granted, we examine the 
facts in the light most favorable to the losing party. '[W]e 
review the trial court's legal conclusions for correctness and give 
no particular deference to that court's view of the law.7" (Cited 
and quoted cases omitted.) 
Similarly, when "summary judgment is granted as a matter of 
law rather than fact [as is the case here where the trial court 
applied Rule 4-501 and where there are undisputed facts], [the 
appellate court] review[s] for correctness or legal conclusions of 
. . . the trial court." See Okubo, 831 P.2d at 102. Accord Themy 
v. Seagull Enterprises, Inc., 595 P.2d 526, 529 (Utah 1979). And 
to the extent this Court's review of the trial court's conclusions 
for summary judgment is based upon a review of evidentiary rulings 
by the court (i.e., whether plaintiffs' allegations were proven by 
competent expert testimony), this Court should not reverse the same 
"unless it is shown that the trial court has abused its 
discretion," Matter of Estate of Justheim, 824 P.2d at 436, since 
"the major purpose of summary judgment is 'to avoid unnecessary 
trial by allowing the parties to pierce the pleadings to determine 
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whether there is a genuine issue to present to the fact finder.'" 
King v. Searle Pharmaceuticals, 832 P.2d 858, 864 n.2 (Utah 1992). 
Applying these cases to the matter at hand demonstrates that 
summary judgment was appropriately granted in this case since 
plaintiff failed to establish by competent and credible evidence 
that Dr. Osborn breached the standard of care proximately causing 
plaintiffs' claimed injuries. 
As argued to the trial court below, the well-established and 
undisputable rule of law dictates that in order to sustain a 
medical malpractice case plaintiffs must establish 
(1) The standard of care by which the doctor's conduct 
is to be measuredf 
(2) Breach of that standard by the doctor, and 
(3) Injury proximately caused by the doctor's 
negligence. 
Chadwick v. Nielsen, 763 P.2d 817, 821 (Utah App. 1988) (citing 
Schmidt v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 635 P.2d 99, 101 (Utah 
1981)) . Importantly, expert testimony in medical malpractice cases 
is limited to that which is within the doctor's specific field of 
practice. See Chadwick, 763 P.2d at 822. 
Relying on these principles of law, Dr. Osborn claimed below 
that he was entitled to summary judgment since plaintiffs had 
failed to meet their burden of proof in this case by not offering 
competent credible testimony of a qualified cardiologist 
specializing in electrophysiology (Dr. Osborn's specialty and 
practice) to establish plaintiffs' claim that Dr. Osborn breached 
the applicable standard of care. In response, plaintiffs presented 
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the affidavit of an emergency room physician, Dr. J. Fred Bushnell, 
to purportedly speak to this standard of care. 
As argued below and in connection with the rule of law 
establishing plaintiffs' burden of proof and Dr. Osborn's motion to 
strike the affidavit offered by plaintiffs' emergency room expert, 
the Utah Supreme Court has previously ruled that even an ocular 
plastic surgeon cannot testify competently in a medical malpractice 
action against a general plastic surgeon who performed eyelid 
surgery when there is no foundation to establish that any general 
plastic surgeon performing the procedure would employ the same 
methods and follow the same procedures as those the ocular plastic 
surgeon might purport to describe. See Burton v. Younqblood, 711 
P.2d 245, 249 (Utah 1985). 
Indeed, in Burton the Court ruled that "ordinarily, a 
practitioner of one school of medicine is not competent to testify 
as an expert in a malpractice action against a practitioner of 
another school." See 711 P.2d at 248. In order for the Court to 
apply any exception to this rule plaintiffs in this case were 
required to first lay sufficient foundation to show that the method 
of treatment, and hence the standard of care, is identical to both 
a physician skilled in cardiovascular diseases and 
electrophysiology (Dr. Osborn's practice) and a physician skilled 
in emergency room medicine (the specialty of plaintiffs' expert). 
This plaintiffs could not do through the mere presentation of the 
testimony of an expert emergency room physician not skilled in the 
specifics of cardiovascular diseases and electrophysiology. In 
23 
fact, the Utah Supreme Court in Burton found no error with the 
trial court's decision therein (that a physician in one specialty 
was incapable of testifying as to the standard of care of a 
physician in another specialty) when the expert based his opinion 
merely upon his personal training and experience and was unable to 
show that any physician schooled in the medical specialty practiced 
by the defendant physician would employ the expert's methods and 
follow the expert's procedures. Id. 
Moreover, as the Burton court recognized, cases in other 
jurisdictions follow this holding. Indeed, in Caro v. Bumpus, 491 
P.2d 606 (Colo. App. 1970), cited with approval in Burton, that 
court ruled: 
Courts require proof by competent evidence that the 
methods of treatment are the same for the defendant's 
school of medicine and the expert witness's school of 
medicine. 
Id. at 608. Therein, the court held that because the proposed 
expert was not of the same school as the defendant the proposed 
expert could not himself provide this required testimony. In fact, 
the court noted that competent evidence that the methods of 
treatment are the same for the two schools of medicine could not be 
provided except (1) by the defendant himself; (2) by a witness who 
was an expert in both schools; (3) or by testimony of a 
practitioner of defendant's own school. Certainly no such 
testimony was provided here and thus the trial court could have 
correctly ruled that there was no competent evidence that the 
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methods of treatment for an emergency room physician and a 
cardiologist specializing in electrophysiology are the same. 
Likewise, in Gaston v. Hunter, 588 P.2d 326 (Ariz. App. 1978) , 
also cited with approval in Burton, that court ruled: "The mere 
fact that two specialties may treat the same symptoms or perform 
the same operations does not imply that a physician's conduct will 
no longer be tested by the standards of his own school or his own 
specialty." Id. at 347-48 (citations omitted). See also Prosser 
163, ch. 5, § 32 (4th ed.) ("The courts have been compelled to 
recognize that there are areas in which even experts will disagree. 
Where there are different schools of medical thought, it is held 
that the dispute cannot be settled by the law, and the doctor is 
entitled to be judged according to the tenets of the school he 
professes to follow." (Footnote omitted.)). 
And, most recently in Arnold v. Curtis, 846 P.2d 1307 (Utah 
1993), our Supreme Court again reiterated that an exception to the 
rule that a practitioner in one specialty is not ordinarily 
competent to testify as an expert on the standard of care 
applicable in another specialty is only made "when a witness is 
knowledgeable about the standard of care of another specialty or 
when the standards of different specialties on the issue in a 
particular case are the same." Id. at 1310. 
Applying these cases to the facts at hand demonstrates the 
propriety of the court's awarding Dr. Osborn summary judgment in 
this case. Indeed, the affidavit of plaintiffs7 emergency room 
physician that plaintiffs sought to offer to oppose summary 
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judgment in this case in favor of the cardiologist specializing in 
electrophysiology (Dr. Osborn) fails to establish the following 
requirements established by the above case law: (1) that a 
cardiologist specializing in electrophysiology would employ the 
same methods and follow the same procedures as those plaintiffs' 
emergency room physician purported to describe (Burton. 711 P.2d at 
249); (2) that the method of treatment and hence the standard of 
care is identical to both a physician skilled in cardiovascular 
diseases and electrophysiology and a physician skilled in emergency 
room medicine (id.); (3) that the emergency room physician can 
testify as to cardiology when there is a board certification and 
recognized medical specialty of cardiology (State v. Warden. 784 
P.2d 1204 (Utah 1989), rev'd, 813 P.2d 1146 (1991)); (4) that the 
emergency room physician was an expert in not only emergency room 
medicine but also cardiology and electrophysiology fCaro v. Bumpus, 
492 P.2d 606 (cited in Burton. supra)); and (5) that plaintiffs' 
emergency room physician expert was even knowledgeable about the 
standard of care applicable to a cardiologist specializing in 
electrophysiology and could testify that that standard of care was 
identical to that which may be followed by an emergency room 
physician. (Arnold, 846 at 1310.) In fact, the affidavit of 
plaintiffs' emergency room physician never even demonstrated that 
that physician was aware of the appropriate methods, procedures of 
diagnosing, treatment and investigation which reasonable 
cardiologists would employ in similar circumstances* 
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Instead, the affidavit of plaintiffs' emergency room physician 
expert sought to establish the standard of care applicable to 
cardiologist/electrophysiologist Dr. Osborn merely by claiming: 
(1) "I am specialty qualified in emergency medicine. I am also 
board eligible in quality assurance and utilization review"; (2) 
having read and studied medical records and transcripts of the 
depositions "I have formed a professional opinion as to the 
standard of medical care applicable in this case and whether Drs. 
Osborn and Dowdall [emergency room physician defendant who settled 
out of this case] adhered to that standard of care in their 
treatment of Ted Dikeou"; and (3) "Dr. Osborn was aware of the 
unique nature of [the occurrence of plaintiff's complaints of a 
rapid heart rate] and by his own testimony noted that this 
prolonged episode warranted further testing, investigation and 
treatment of Ted Dikeou's prolonged tachycardia—a presentation 
made gravely ominous by Ted's known diagnosis of Wolff-Parkinson-
White syndrome. This is the standard of medical care which applies 
to Dr. Jeffrey Osborn." (See affidavit at paras. 7, 10, 13 at R. 
233-34.) These claims are sorely inadequate to meet the 
requirements. Accordingly, summary judgment was appropriate in 
this case since plaintiffs were unable to comply with their burden 
of proof. 
As an aside, under the Supreme Court's recent ruling in 
Arnold, this Court can also correctly conclude that the trial court 
appropriately granted summary judgment in this case since the 
affidavit of plaintiffs' emergency room expert does not 
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sufficiently establish that Dr. Osborn's alleged breach of the 
standard of care proximately caused plaintiffs' claimed injuries. 
Indeed, in this case plaintiffs claim that they incurred damages 
due to the cardiac arrest, coma and death of their son. 
Nevertheless, in his affidavit plaintiffs' expert only states 
insofar as the element of "causation" and Dr. Osborn are concerned 
that Dr. Osborn's suggestion of the administration of medication 
played "a major role in the exacerbation of Ted's condition and his 
subsequent cardiac arrest, coma and death." (See R. 235 at 1F 19.) 
Since the affidavit does not explicitly draw the required proximate 
causal link between Dr. Osborn's actions or alleged failures to act 
and the death of Ted Dikeou, the trial court could correctly grant 
Dr. Osborn summary judgment in this case.1 See Arnold, 846 P.2d 
at 1310-11. 
In sum, since the testimony purportedly offered by plaintiffs' 
emergency room expert was not competent or credible to address the 
standard of care required of a physician specializing in 
cardiovascular diseases and electrophysiology as is Dr. Osborn, 
Similarly, as set forth in Point III, infra, the trial court 
could correctly grant summary judgment in this case based solely 
upon the fact that plaintiffs themselves admitted under oath and 
filed a statement in the record claiming that plaintiffs believed 
that the substance of the allegations against Dr. Osborn were "best 
answered by a medical expert in the field of cardiology, and in 
response [attached] a copy of a letter opinion from Michael D. 
Lesh, M.D., a cardiologist contacted by plaintiffs' attorney." (R. 
246.) And Dr. Lesh's letter provided to the court fails in any 
regard to demonstrate any causal link between Dr. Osborn's 
treatment and care of Ted Dikeou and his ultimate coma and death. 
(See R. 312-13.) 
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plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of proof as required under 
Utah law and the trial court correctly granted Dr. Osborn's motion 
for summary judgment. 
Point II 
The Trial Court/s Order Striking the Affidavit 
of Plaintiffs' Proposed Emergency Room Expert 
Was Appropriate Since the Affidavit Attempted 
to Raise Matters Not Properly Admissible in Evidence 
As stated by the Supreme Court in Anton v. Thomas. 806 P.2d 
744 (Utah App. 1991), "the trial court has discretion to determine 
the admissibility of expert testimony, and to determine if the 
witness is qualified to give an opinion on a particular matter. 
Such a ruling will not be reversed unless the trial court abused 
its discretion in excluding the expert testimony and, even then, 
only if the appellant can show 'the excluded evidence would 
probably have had a substantial influence in bringing about a 
different verdict." 
Admission of expert testimony requires proper foundation to 
qualify the witness. Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure requires that affidavits be made on personal knowledge 
and set forth facts that would be admissible in evidence or show 
affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to matters 
stated in those affidavits. As the Utah Supreme Court has ruled: 
"An affidavit that does not measure up to the 
standards of [Rule] 56(e) is subject to a motion to 
strike; and formal defects are waived in the absence of 
such a motion or other objection." This is particularly 
true where the opposing affidavit of the plaintiff is 
self-serving and the testimony thereinf if given at 
trial, could be disbelieved by the jury. 
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Howick v. Bank of Salt Lake, 498 P.2d 352, 353-54 (Utah 1972) 
(footnote and citation omitted). Further, an affidavit which 
merely reflects the affiant's unsubstantiated conclusion and which 
fails to state evidentiary facts is insufficient to create an issue 
of fact. Wallier v. Pope, 508 P.2d 538, 542 (Utah 1973). And this 
Court in King v. Searle Pharmaceuticals, Inc., noted that 
"affidavits of experts are insufficient to defeat summary judgment 
unless foundational facts are set forth supporting their opinions 
and conclusions." 832 P.2d at 864 n.2 (citing Butterfield v. 
Okubo, 831 P.2d 97, 104 (Utah 1992)); accord Walker v. Rocky 
Mountain Recreational Corp., 508 P.2d 538, 542 (Utah 1973) (summary 
judgment appropriate since opposing affidavit revealed no 
evidentiary facts and only reflected affiant's unsubstantiated 
opinions and conclusions). 
Here, the trial court considered the affidavit of plaintiffs' 
expert and ruled that (1) it failed to demonstrate that the affiant 
was competent and capable to testify as to the standard of care 
required of a cardiologist specializing in electrophysiology such 
as Dr. Osborn in this case; (2) the affidavit lacked foundation, 
(3) it was based on hearsay, (4) it did not demonstrate the same 
criteria exist for cardiologists and emergency room medicine 
physicians, (5) it was based on speculation, and (6) it did not 
accurately state the evidence from the record. (See R. 287-89.) 
A plain reading of the affidavit of plaintiffs' expert 
Dr. Bushnell offered in opposition to Dr. Osborn's motion for 
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summary judgment clearly demonstrates the appropriateness of the 
trial court's rule striking the same. 
For example, paragraphs 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 18, 19, 23 and 
each paragraph referencing the standard of care applicable to Dr. 
Osborn are inadmissible since there is no foundation and no 
competent and credible evidence offered demonstrating that Dr. 
Bushnell is even aware of much less capable to testify as to the 
standard of care required of a physician specializing in 
cardiovascular diseases and electrophysiology. (See Point I, 
supra.) 
Second, as the court noted paragraphs 11 through 23 of Dr. 
Bushnell's affidavit were appropriately stricken since (a) they are 
based on speculation, (b) they are vague and overbroad, (c) they 
misstate the undisputed evidence, and (d) they lack foundation as 
to the matters they purport to address.2 Also, allegations set 
2See for example paragraph 11 involving speculation, lacking 
foundation and based upon unsubstantiated opinion regarding whether 
Dr. Osborn was the physician best informed of plaintiff's 
condition, health and medical information, paragraph 12 referencing 
hearsay, paragraph 13 involving speculation regarding whether Dr. 
Osborn was or was not aware of certain information, paragraph 12 
which misstates the facts before the court to the extent it 
impliedly represents that the decedent was not receiving further 
testing, investigation and treatment (cf» R. 158 regarding fact 
that plaintiff was obtaining further testing, investigation and 
treatment), paragraph 14 offering speculation as to what Dr. Osborn 
was made aware, paragraph 15 offering speculation as to what 
Dr. Osborn failed to appreciate, paragraph 15 misstating the facts 
as to Dr. Osborn failing to investigate his patient's symptoms (cf. 
R. 158), paragraph 17 based on speculation and hearsay as to why 
Dr. Dowdall called Dr. Osborn, paragraph 18 offering speculation as 
to what Dr. Osborn knew and should have known and exhibiting no 
foundation as to whether Dr. Osborn could have requested the 
decedent be transferred or another physician called in, paragraph 
19 based on hearsay, paragraph 20 lacking foundation, and paragraph 
21 lacking foundation and based on hearsay. (R. 232-36.) 
31 
forth in those paragraphs are conclusionary and improperly seek to 
address legal theories. (See, e.g., paragraph 23 purporting to 
address the ultimate legal conclusion of negligence. (R. at 236.)) 
Based upon the foregoing case law and a plain review of Dr. 
Bushnell's affidavit, the trial court appropriately ordered the 
affidavit stricken and this Court should affirm its ruling on 
appeal• 
A. Plaintiffs offered no support to the trial court for their 
allegations concerning the applicable standard of care: and 
case law and treatise support plaintiffs proposed below 
categorically demonstrated that the affidavit of plaintiffs* 
expert was appropriately stricken» 
Importantly, as set forth for the Court below, in their 
opposition memorandum to Dr. Osborn's motion to strike plaintiffs 
essentially argued that their expert emergency room physician could 
testify as to the standard of medical care required of a 
cardiologist specializing in electrophysiology. Instead of having 
their emergency room expert lay the foundation therefor, however, 
plaintiffs merely offered the unsupported claims that 
1. "All physicians undergo the same basic medical training, 
and the basic duty and standards of care a physician owes 
his patient remain the same, despite various areas of 
specialization." (R. 276 at p. 4.); 
2. "Common to all areas of medical practice in that standard 
of care is that a physician not abandon his patient in an 
emergency situation until and unless a physician of equal 
or superior training and ability is available to assume 
that patient's care." (Id.); 
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< ; 
5. Plaint emergency iwwm physician expert ormed 
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6. P"I ' i 
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7. Plain-
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of care ehpecteii 1 r c nil d cardiologist (If, 278.) 
Nevertheless, these allegations were unsupported by \\\\y sworn 
testimony or recon- 'uidenui.
 r a i u i «. v'i u I lie dli idd\i i I | L M I » • r 
own expert did not establish these claims (Plaintiffs also never 
offered a supplement
 L aifidaviL by theii expert tin support these 
theories,) Absent ,.is sunnnrt. summary stdtenei11 - "hy | l| i ill il'fs 
were self-serving and o< \ --1\ inadequate I D iivoi.d defendant's 
iiiiiiiii 11 mi 11 mi in«• II 111 " i 11 iniiiiii in in y ; to strike.3 
Similarly, the fact that appellants wish to asser t on appeal 
that (1) "the claimed negligence in this case did not deal with an 
issue unique to Dr Osborn's specialty" and (2) ' [a] reasonable 
inference is that had Dr, Osborn [as a cardiologist] personally 
examined his patient rather than relying on the diagnosis of a non-
{continued , ) 
Further, in offering case law and treatise support for their 
claims, plaintiffs ignored the view that in order to establish a 
breach of the standard of care by cardiologists, the plaintiffs 
were required to offer the testimony of a physician in the same 
specialty as the defendant. For example, although plaintiffs cited 
Virginia S. v. Salt Lake Care Center, 741 P.2d 969 (Utah App. 
1987) , to the trial court below for the rule that an expert witness 
need not testify if the matters are so widely known by the general 
public, that case does not apply here as this Court can take 
judicial notice of the fact that cardiology and electrophysiology 
are not matters within the common purview or experience of the lay 
person. 
Also, although plaintiffs cited the trial court to 33 Am. Jur. 
2d Proof of Facts in support of their view that "'a general 
practitioner, or a specialist in a field different from the 
3(...continued) 
cardiologist, he would have discovered the decedent's actual 
condition and would have given correct advice," see plaintiffs 
brief at 12-13, is not supported by any reference to the record. 
This may be the belief of appellants' attorneys, but plaintiffs' 
expert emergency room physician has not established that the 
negligence was unrelated to Dr. Osborn's specialty or that that 
emergency room physician knows what is unique to a cardiology and 
electrophysiology specialty. Also, these two statements 
demonstrate the meritless nature of plaintiffs' claims since on one 
hand plaintiffs essentially argue that the treatment was not unique 
to Dr. Osborn's specialty while on the other hand claim that a 
cardiologist such as Dr. Osborn should not have relied upon the 
diagnosis of a noncardiologist. See brief at 12-13. These facts 
clearly demonstrate the impropriety of the affidavit offered and 
the wisdom of the court's ruling in deciding that plaintiffs' 
expert emergency room physician had not established he knew what 
cardiologists and electrophysiologists should have known or done 
under these circumstances. 
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defendants may li .tify i i yarding the specialist's alleged 
malpractice nr the witnesses in fact- familiar wjili i he subject at 
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 r § 8 n , 49 (cita tion oini tted; emphasis 
added), See also 3 Medical Malpractice U 29.02[3] (1989) ; Kronke 
by statute as s tated in McGuire v, DeFrancesco, 8] ] 1 , 2ci 340' (Ari z. 
App. 1990) ("to quali fy an expert to express an opini on on what the 
s t anda i: c:i c f ::  a i: s :i s f :: iii:: the • spec: 
offering the wi tnesg i must establish . cness ' s knowledge ana 
familiarity wi th the standard * *reatment commonly 
J j: ihy si ci ans engaged 
the defendant" )) Si nee plaintixrs tailed t. mee: Lt>-* requirements 
of this rule, summary statements in Dr. Busheell/s affidavit lacked 
suf l icieiJl,, t ijiuinldLioit arid were appropriately str icken as a matter 
of law. 
B. The trial court appropriately determined that the inadmissible 
affidavit of plaintiffs' expert could not be salvaged because 
it arguably raised questions of fact. 
In entering its ruling the trial court correctly noted in part 
that plaintiffs' "claim of allegations of fact being extant simply 
is not supported by the record." (R. at 287-89.) For example, 
examination of paragraph 21 of the affidavit of plaintiffs' expert 
purports to claim that Dr. Osborn could have been granted courtesy 
privileges had he presented himself at St. Mark's Hospital since 
"in fact, a few days later, by Dr. Osborn's deposition testimony, 
he did appear at St. Mark's Hospital and was permitted to check on 
Ted Dikeou and review his medical records." (R. at 235-36 1F 21.) 
Nevertheless, the trial court could appropriately conclude that 
statements such as this did "not state the evidence as it appears 
from the record" (R. at 287-89) since the court had before it that 
section of Dr. Osborn's deposition plaintiffs cite that 
unequivocally indicates: 
Q: Had you gone to the ER and looked at the strip 
would you have told him "it's atrial fib and don't 
give him the verapamil? 
A: I would not feel comfortable going to St. Mark's 
and doing that. I did not have privileges. 
Q: Three days later you did the same thing. You went 
to St. Mark's and looked at the chart? 
A: Correct. 
Q: You see a difference between doing that three or 
four days later and doing it at the emergency room? 
You see a distinction? 
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A: Correct. My purpose in my visit was social with 
the Dikeous.4 
(R. at 160.) 
Point III 
Summary Judgment Was Appropriate Since the Plaintiffs 
Themselves Verified Under Oath That a Cardiologist 
Would Need to Speak to the Standard of Care Applicable 
to Dr. Osborn/s Treatment and No Testimony 
From a Cardiologist Was Provided 
As noted in the court's own minute entry, "the record reveals 
admission sufficient to support the motion for summary judgment." 
(See R. at 287-89.) Even though plaintiffs filed with the Court 
their answers to defendant's interrogatories as part of plaintiffs' 
exhibits in support of their opposition to defendant's motion for 
summary judgment (R. at 244-51) and even though the Court's own 
minute entry evidently reflected that admissions in the records 
supported the granting of summary judgment, Dr. Osborn offered a 
motion for filing of discovery responses with supporting memorandum 
in order to further highlight the fact that in plaintiffs' answers 
to defendant's interrogatoriesf plaintiffs admitted under oath that 
plaintiffs believed that the interrogatory concerning the substance 
of the allegations against Dr. Osborn was "best answered by a 
medical expert in the field of cardiology, and in response [attach] 
a copy of a letter opinion from Michael D. Lesh, M.D., a 
40ther examples where the court could have concluded that 
allegations of fact being extant were not supported by the record 
are referenced at page 32-33, infra (R. 276 and R. 278 analysis); 
and footnote No. 2, infra. 
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cardiologist contacted by Plaintiff's attorney."5 (See R. at 246 
(filed by plaintiffs) and R. 300-306 (redundant filing by 
defendant).) 
Not only then could the court have correctly recognized that 
plaintiffs admitted below that a cardiologist was the physician 
best competent and capable to speak to the standard of care 
involving Dr. Osborn's involvement in this case, but even the 
cardiologist plaintiffs identified in their answers to defendant's 
interrogatories was unwilling to state that Dr. Osborn breached the 
applicable standard of care. (See the letter from Dr. Michael D. 
Lesh sent to plaintiffs' attorney and dated July 29, 1991, R. at 
312-13.) And importantly, the court had before it the record which 
also demonstrated that only twelve days before offering the 
affidavit of an emergency room expert and after being made aware 
that Dr. Osborn's motion for summary judgment had been filed (which 
motion included a memorandum explicitly putting plaintiffs on 
notice of defendant's view and this Court's case law that "expert 
testimony in medical malpractice cases is limited to that which is 
within the doctor's specific field of practice" (R. 148)), 
plaintiffs filed their designation of witnesses with the court 
which designation expressly limited Dr. Bushnell's testimony 
regarding the standard of care to that of an "emergency room 
physician." (R. 222, quoted at factual statement No. 5, infra.) 
5For treatment of whether the court properly allowed for 
supplementation of the record, see Argument, Point V, infra. 
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Accordingly/ by plaintiffs' own "admissions" the trial court 
could correctly rule that summary judgment was appropriate since 
plaintiffs' own cardiologist drew no causal link between Dr. 
Osborn's care and plaintiffs' claimed damages (R. 312-13), and 
plaintiffs' emergency room physician was limited in testifying to 
the standard of care of an emergency room physician (R. 222). See 
Arnold, 846 P.2d at 1310-11. This Court should not reverse this 
determination since it is not clearly erroneous. Cf. Thurman, 846 
P.2d at 1271 (clearly erroneous standard applies in evaluating 
reliance on confession). 
Issue IV 
Since Plaintiffs Failed to Properly Controvert 
the Facts Set Forth in Dr. Osborn/s Memorandum 
in Support of His Motion for Summary Judgment, 
the Trial Court Correctly Concluded That Those Facts 
Were Deemed Admitted and Summary Judgment 
for Dr. Osborn Was Appropriate as a Matter of Law 
The rules of this Court clearly set forth plaintiffs' 
responsibility in seeking to oppose a motion for summary judgment 
and the consequences when plaintiffs fail to comply with such 
rules. See Rule 4-501(2) (b) of the Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration. Importantly, this rule is not permissive but 
states that material facts properly set forth in the movant's 
statement shall be deemed admitted unless specifically controverted 
as required by this rule. 
In view of this rule, pages 3 through 11 of Dr. Osborn's 
memorandum in support of his motion set forth 32 numbered 
paragraphs referencing specific facts and sworn testimony 
39 
supportive of Dr. Osborn's motion for summary judgment. In 
response, howeverf plaintiffs failed to (1) offer any "concise 
statement of material facts" as to which plaintiffs contend a 
genuine issue exists; (2) set forth each disputed fact in separate 
numbered sentences referring to appropriate portions of the record; 
and (3) specifically controvert each of the facts offered by 
Dr. Osborn. (R. 287-89; compare plaintiffs' opposition memorandum 
at R. 225-26 with defendant's memorandum at R. 137-45.) These 
failures to comply with the express and unequivocal requirements of 
Rule 4-501(2)(b) mandated that summary judgment be afforded 
Dr. Osborn on the grounds and bases set forth in Dr. Osborn's 
memorandum in support of his motion for summary judgment. 
Further, although plaintiffs cite the decision in Thomas J. 
Peck & Sons, Inc. v. Lee Rock Products, Inc., 515 P.2d 446, 449-50 
(Utah 1973), for the principle that the "pleadings are never more 
important than the cause that is before the court," that case is 
inapposite since it involves tardy amendment sought to be made to 
pleadings and not the standard for summary judgment. And, although 
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure does limit the 
granting of summary judgment only "if the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories and admissions on file together with the 
affidavits if any showed that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material facts and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment 
as a matter of law," this does not obviate the responsibility of 
the nonmoving party to demonstrate to the court what pleadings, 
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depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file and 
affidavits demonstrate a genuine dispute• 
Indeed, the fact that plaintiffs' failure to comply with Rule 
4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration is a sufficient 
basis for the court's granting Dr. Osborn summary judgment in this 
case is demonstrated by analogizing those rules of appellate review 
that hold that a party cannot expect the court on appeal to review 
the entire record for the party and glean from it the arguments 
supporting a party's position. See generally State v. Tillman, 750 
P. 2d 546 (Utah 1987) (even in a case involving appeal of 
involuntary manslaughter conviction "it is not the duty nor 
prerogative of the appellate court to search the record or the 
instructions to find error"); State v. Eldredqe, 773 P.2d 29, 41 
(Utah), cert, denied, 493 U.S. 814 (1989) (Stewart, J., dissenting) 
("it can hardly be maintained that an appellate court in the proper 
conduct of its business can, or should, spend the time searching 
for error in a case and in effect re-lawyer the entire matter from 
the ground up"); State v. Larsen, 828 P.2d 487, 490 (Utah App.), 
cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (1992) ("the purpose of the marshalling 
requirement is to spare appellate courts the onerous burden of 
combing through the record in search of supporting factual matters" 
(cited case omitted)). 
In short, as this Court has previously held, "we will not 
interfere with the trial court's case management unless its actions 
amount to an abuse of discretion." Berrett v. Denver & Rio Grande. 
830 P.2d 291, 293 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (1992). 
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Certainly Judge Moffat's decision to grant Dr. Osborn summary 
judgment in part because of plaintiffs' failure to comply with Rule 
4-501 was a discretionary case management decision which was not 
abused. 
Point V 
This Court Should Not Consider Plaintiffs' Claims 
(Regarding the Court Ordering Additional Materials 
in the Record) When Plaintiffs Did Not Raise This Issue 
in Their Docketing Statement on Appeal 
The Utah appellate courts have long upheld the rule that they 
will generally refuse to consider issues not presented to the trial 
court below, even if the issues arguably involve only legal 
questions. See Zions First National Bank v. National American 
Title Insurance, 749 P.2d 651, 654 (Utah 1988) (and cases cited 
therein). 
For example, in Allisen v. American Legion Post 134, 763 P.2d 
806 (Utah 1988) , the Utah Supreme Court concluded that it would not 
consider a theory of recovery raised on appeal where a different 
theory was alleged under the complaint and the trial court had 
limited its ruling to the theory raised in the plaintiff s 
complaint. See id. at 807-809. Similarly, this Court has 
heretofore considered the inefficacy and inappropriateness of a 
petitioner raising issues for the first time in a petition for 
rehearing. State v. Sampson, 808 P.2d 1100, 1112 (Utah App. 1990), 
cert, denied, 817 P.2d 327 (1991). 
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Certainly this correct principle of law should likewise apply 
in cases where the appellant seeks to brief an argument not set 
forth in his or her docketing statement. 
Here, in plaintiffs7 docketing statement the sole issues for 
review were stated: 
a. Did the trial court err in rejecting, on a 
motion for summary judgment, an emergency room 
physician's testimony that the defendant cardiologist had 
a duty to go to the emergency room, if necessary, to make 
a proper diagnosis, rather than relying on the erroneous 
diagnosis of a non-cardiologist emergency room physician? 
The sufficiency of the affidavit to defeat a motion for 
summary judgment is a question of law and is reviewed for 
correctness. Butterfield v. Okubo, 831 P.2d 97, 101-02 
(Utah 1992). 
b. Did the trial court err in concluding there 
were no disputed issues of material fact, where 
defendant's assertion of no negligence was based on 
defendant's testimony that he could not have treated the 
decedent at a hospital where he did not have staff 
privileges, whereas plaintiffs presented evidence that 
defendant could have rendered treatment notwithstanding 
the lack of staff privileges? This question of law is 
reviewed for correctness. Id* 
(See appellate record.) Based upon these issues set forth in the 
docketing statement, then, and absent any showing of good cause to 
the contrary, plaintiffs' claim in their brief that the trial court 
incorrectly considered additional information prior to entering its 
final judgment and order could appropriately be overlooked by this 
Court. See generally Matter of Estate of Justheim, 824 P.2d 432, 
437 (Utah App. 1991) ("Appellants did not mention this issue in the 
docketing statement nor in their main brief. The claimed error was 
not timely specified at the trial court, so it could be considered 
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there, nor was it timely specified on appeal pursuant to Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure 9, 11 and 24.") 
As Rule 9 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure governing 
docketing statements in part dictates, "The docketing statement 
shall contain the following information . . . (5) the issues 
presented by the appeal." Accordingly, based upon appellants7 
failure to set forth in their docketing statement the issue they 
now seek to brief on appeal, this Court should not consider whether 
or not the trial court appropriately allowed the record to be 
supplemented after entering its minute entry below. 
Point VI 
Even If This Court Chooses to Analyze Plaintiffs' 
Argument Not Raised in Their Docketing Statement 
(Concerning Additional Information the Court Ordered 
Placed in the Record), the Trial Court Did Hot Abuse 
Its Discretion and the Decision 
Was at Worst Harmless Error 
As the above factual statement indicates on May 8, 1992, 
Dr. Osborn filed a motion for filing of discovery responses with 
supporting memorandum and exhibits. Therein, Dr. Osborn moved the 
court to order that plaintiffs7 answers to Dr. Osborn7s 
interrogatories and answers to defendant St. Mark's Hospital's 
first set of interrogatories be filed as part of the record in this 
case. See R. 297. Importantly, this motion was redundant insofar 
as plaintiffs7 answers to Dr. Osborn7s interrogatories were 
concerned since plaintiffs themselves had already filed those 
interrogatory answers with the court as an exhibit to their 
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memorandum in opposition to Dr. Osborn's motion for summary 
judgment. See R. 246. 
Plaintiffs complain that the court erred in granting this 
motion for filing of discovery responses since plaintiffs did not 
have sufficient opportunity to respond thereto and since the 
matters were not properly a part of the record or the court's 
consideration. These arguments are erroneous for the following 
reasons. 
First, as page 246 of the record indicates, plaintiffs 
themselves filed with the court their answers to Dr. Osborn's 
interrogatories including their answer to Interrogatory No. 2 
wherein they state under oath that they believe the allegations 
against Dr. Osborn are "best answered by a medical expert in the 
field of cardiology." Accordingly, when Dr. Osborn moved the court 
to allow it to file another copy of those discovery requests, it 
was appropriate for the court in its discretion to authorize this 
request since essentially the same information was already in the 
record. By filing the answers themselves plaintiffs waived any 
objection thereto and cannot credibly claim they were prejudiced by 
the lack of any opportunity to brief the supplementation issue. 
Second, as the court's own minute entry indicates at the time 
it entered summary judgment it was "fully advised in the premises" 
and thus it must be presumed that the court considered the entire 
record including plaintiffs' opposition memorandum and exhibits 
thereto which included the very interrogatory answers Dr. Osborn 
sought to refile. 
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Third, although plaintiffs claim that they did not have an 
opportunity to respond to the motion to file discovery responses 
until after the court ruled on the same, plaintiffs ignore the fact 
that they did not file their opposition timely under Rule 4-501 of 
the Utah Code of Judicial Administration in any event since 
(without leave of court) it was filed approximately 14 days after 
the court entered its order and some 21 days after having received 
Dr. Osborn's motion to supplement the record. See R. 346-49. 
Fourth, the cases plaintiffs cite in support of their 
proposition that the court erred in granting this motion are 
inapposite and do not apply in this case. Indeed, none of the 
cases involve facts similar to this case and those that hold that 
the court should consider only the record at the time the judgment 
was entered involve appellate court standards of review. See, 
e.g., Reserve Insurance Co. v. Pisciotta, 640 P.2d 764, 771 (Utah 
1982); Moore v. Pacific Northwest Bell, 662 P.2d 398, 403 (Wash. 
App. 1983); and the one Utah case cited involves Rule 11 of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure for supplementing the appellate 
record when necessary, which rule is not applicable here as 
defendant never sought to supplement the appellate record. See 
Olson v. Park Craig Olson, Inc., 815 P.2d 1356, 1359 (Utah App. 
1991).6 
6If appellants evidently wish to argue that Judge Moffat's 
decision to grant defendant's order to file answers to 
interrogatories in the record was a post-judgment ruling, this is 
not the case since judgment was not entered until the same day the 
court ordered the record supplemented. See R. 339 and 342. 
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In contrast, the Utah Supreme Court in Franklin Financial v. 
New Empire Development Co., 659 P.2d 1040, 1045 (Utah 1983), 
indicated that all that needs to essentially be shown is that 
matters were timely presented to the trial court sufficient to 
obtain a ruling thereon and that "the burden is on the parties to 
make certain that the record they compile will adequately preserve 
their arguments for review in the event of an appeal." Under this 
standard, Dr. Osborn's motion to file answers to plaintiffs7 
interrogatories was timely submitted and met Dr. Osborn's burden to 
make certain the record would adequately preserve his arguments for 
appeal. 
In sum, before summary judgment was entered plaintiffs 
voluntarily submitted information in their sworn statements that 
their allegations against Dr. Osborn were best supported by a 
cardiologist. Also, plaintiffs had served defendant with a letter 
from that cardiologist (that defendant wanted filed), see R. 312-
13, which was not even critical of Dr. Osborn and demonstrated 
plaintiffs' inability to meet their burden of proof concerning a 
breach of the applicable standard of care proximately causing 
plaintiffs' claimed injuries. Thereafter, plaintiffs evidently 
hoped the court would ignore the fact that their own sworn 
admission established that summary judgment was appropriate in this 
case. This, however, the court evidently did not do. Instead, 
before Dr. Osborn's counsel ever moved the court to file answers to 
interrogatories, the court on April 17, 1992, in its signed minute 
entry indicated that summary judgment was appropriate among other 
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reasons since "the record reveals admissions sufficient to support 
the motion for summary judgment." See R. 289. Based upon the fact 
that plaintiffs can demonstrate no prejudice by the court granting 
Dr. Osborn's motion to file additional matters in the record, 
appellants' argument in this respect is without merit and the 
court's decision was at worst harmless error. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court correctly granted summary judgment in this 
case since plaintiffs failed to present evidence of a competent and 
credible expert familiar with Dr. Osborn's specialty that Dr. 
Osborn breached the applicable standard of care proximately causing 
plaintiffs' claimed injuries. Further, the trial court correctly 
ordered stricken the affidavit of plaintiffs' emergency room expert 
since it lacked foundation and was based upon speculation, hearsay 
and did not correctly state evidence from the record. 
Finally, the court correctly ruled that summary judgment was 
appropriate in this case given the Dikeous' failure to comply with 
Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration and based 
upon their own admissions in the record as to their inability to 
meet their burden of proof. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / T day of 
1993. 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH 
Jaryl L. Rencher 
Attorneys for Defendant/ 
Appellee Dr. Osborn 
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